Below is a sketch for an article that was prompted by my reading a paper in which a liberal Christian theologian wrote about postmodern theorists, conservative Christian theologians, and liberals such as himself (both among Christian theologians and in the wider stream of post-Enlightenment liberal thinking). Reading this paper, it struck me that these three groups were being cast in certain roles vis-a-vis each other which could be changed around – indeed they do have these alternative roles relative to each other in the thinking of some other writers.

In the article sketched below, I go no further than to demonstrate this. What I indicate is a hermeneutical framework which can be applied in three ways. This far, it is relativistic; the question which is the ‘right’ application of the framework is not discussed. So it is rather like Basil Mitchell’s paper ‘How to Play Theological Ping-Pong’, which does not discuss discerning a right strategic move in theological debate, but only the employment of certain strategic moves abstracted from such discernment.

In practice, I would argue, the key question is precisely the question of what is involved in such discernment. I would want to argue that reflection upon the death of Jesus Christ affords the context in which these various applications of the hermeneutical framework are revealed and judged for what they are.

THREE ACTORS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE ROLES

In the paper which prompted this sketch, written by a liberal Christian theologian, conservative theologians, liberals and postmodernists are to be characterised as follows:

The Conservative Theologians

These are by definition closed to the truth, being guilty of uncritical allegiance to fixed beliefs and practices, and of hegemony.

The Liberals

Liberalism is pure in its concern for the truth. The enemy of truth is uncritical allegiance/presupposition/prejudice and its hegemony, as exemplified by conservative theologians. If liberals have themselves ever been guilty of these things, then they have betrayed liberalism - probably under duress from outside. By definition, therefore, the example of such liberals does not count towards the definition of the liberalism. Liberalism is thus defined by pure concern for the truth.

The Postmodernists

These are radicals who see liberals as having failed to shake off the practice of hegemony. While they seem to contradict liberalism, in reality they do so out of a recognition of the incorrigibility with which liberals betray their true vocation; paradoxically they summon liberals back to this true vocation.

Summary: liberals in their relation to conservative theologians and postmodernists

Liberals lead the pursuit of truth. Conservative theologians are by definition closed to this pursuit, and so liberalism necessarily stands in opposition to them. Liberals, too, can become closed to the pursuit of truth, but they are not necessarily closed, as conservative theologians are. Postmodernists criticise liberals insofar as they do become closed to the pursuit of truth, but not otherwise. If postmodernists were to criticise liberals as necessarily closed, then they would be defining 'liberalism' not by its true vision but by its betrayal in closed, hegemonic liberalism. If indeed they seem to do so, this is because they see such betrayal as virtually inescapable; they retain the positive intention of enlivening liberalism radically. This positive intent reveals itself in the presupposition of postmodernism itself, that for its own part it says something about reality and does not merely offer an arbitrary opinion. By their commitment to this presupposition as itself a true statement about reality, postmodernists show that they share the faith of liberals in a reality accessible to exploration.

Now, a suggestion:

1. Within the basic structure of this drama I suggest, quite seriously, that the roles can be changed round. The role fulfilled by liberalism can instead be played by conservative theology, while the role of postmodernists can be played by liberals, as follows:

Conservative theologians lead the pursuit of truth. 'The world' is by definition closed to this pursuit, and so conservative theology necessarily stands in opposition to it. Conservative theologians, too, can become closed to the pursuit of truth, but they are not necessarily closed, as 'the world' is. Liberals criticise conservative theologians insofar as they do become closed to the pursuit of truth, but not otherwise. If liberals were to criticise conservative theologians as necessarily closed, then they would be defining 'conservative theology' not by its true vision but by its betrayal in closed, hegemonic religion. If indeed they seem to do so, this is because they see such betrayal as virtually inescapable; they retain the positive intention of enlivening conservative theology radically. This positive intent reveals itself in the presupposition of liberalism itself, that 'truth is best served by questioning everything critically'. By their commitment to the truth of this proposition itself, liberals show that they share the faith of conservative theologians in the accessibility of sure truth.

2. In the drama as originally staged, the intention of liberalism is unambiguously pure. It is accepted, however, that betrayal is a possibility, even a pressing temptation; but this temptation is held to derive essentially from sources external to liberalism itself.

Let me set the stage in an alternative way, as follows:

(a) Liberalism contains a true impulse which, to remain true, must be endlessly renewed in continuing attentiveness towards reality.

(b) The possibility of betrayal of this impulse does not come simply from outside, but comes just as much from a failure of renewal within.

(c) Such failure of renewal characteristically comprises a diversion and a lapse from continued attentiveness towards reality; the liberal response now defines itself as a second-order response, comprised by the habit of opposition to another's response to reality (viz. conservative theology).

(d) The outlook formed in such lapsed liberalism may be subject to radical criticism (such as that by postmodernism). Such criticism may fail, as the lapsed liberal either assimilates all criticism into his own outlook or else dismisses it, and does not rise to renewed first-order attention to reality. Or such criticism may succeed and renew the true impulse of liberalism, and restore its primary attentiveness towards reality.

(e) The analysis applied here to liberalism applies equally to postmodernism and also to conservative theology. Thus:

            (i) Postmodernism contains a true impulse which, to remain true, must be endlessly renewed in continuing attentiveness towards reality. However, failure of renewal is a pressing temptation. In such failure, postmodernism defines itself as a second-order response, comprised by the habit of opposition to liberalism. Conservative theology is capable of a radical criticism of postmodernism which, if it succeeds, restores postmodernism from relativism to primary attentiveness towards reality.

            (ii) Conservative theology contains a true impulse which, to remain true, must be endlessly renewed in continuing attentiveness towards reality. However, failure of renewal is a pressing temptation. In such failure, conservative theology defines itself as a second-order response, namely the habit of opposition to cultural norms. Liberalism offers a radical criticism of conservative theology which, if it succeeds, restores conservative theology to primary attentiveness towards reality.

Let me enlarge a little on what is involved in this schematisation:

In the drama as originally staged, postmodernism is portrayed as allowing for the possibility of, and indeed actively calling for, the renewal of liberalism in a paradoxical way. But postmodernism may lapse, I suggest, from openness to the possibility of such renewal and instead define liberalism as incapable of such renewal. In so doing it will define itself in second-order fashion, by its opposition to liberalism. However, if postmodernism does this it betrays its own true vision which is to be (as reality requires) more receptive (but no less critical) than liberalism to reality as experienced from other viewpoints. Instead it becomes less critical (and no more receptive) than liberalism in interrogating reality as experienced from other viewpoints. At this point postmodernism lapses from attentiveness to that reality which grounds its own presupposition and which calls this presupposition to endless renewal in paradox. Postmodernism now defines itself implicitly by this incapacity for renewal - and in turn invites radical criticism from another standpoint.

A parallel relation can now be posited between liberalism and conservative theology. Liberalism can be counted as allowing for the possibility of, and indeed actively calling for, the renewal of conservative theology in a paradoxical way. But liberalism may lapse from openness to the possibility of such renewal and instead define conservative theology as incapable of such renewal. In so doing it will define itself in second-order fashion, by its opposition to conservative theology. However; if liberalism does this it betrays its own true vision, which is to be (as reality requires) more critical (but no less receptive) than conservative theology to reality. Instead it becomes less receptive (and no more critical) than conservative theology towards reality. At this point liberalism lapses from attentiveness to that reality which grounds its own presupposition and which calls this presupposition to endless renewal in paradox. Liberalism now defines itself implicitly by this incapacity for renewal - and in turn invites radical criticism from another standpoint (viz. postmodernism).